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DEVELOPING A SECURITY STRATEGY 
FOR INDOCHINA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
by Major Jeffrey F. Addicott* 
Spurred on by the fluidity of current events, America stands at a 
watershed in developing a security strategy for Indochina. As 
“democracy” movements take root in Eastern Europe and promises 
of Soviet troop restructuring capture world headlines, the United 
States is rapidly assessing the impact that substantial American force 
reductions will have on global security responsibilities? While most 
of the focus seems to be in the NATO arena, serious thought must 
be given to the equally complex problem of U.S. military retrench- 
ments in the Pacific Rim. In this context, one of the most troubling 
issues is the impact of significant military reductions on those 
developing nations in the Asian Basin that currently have no gar- 
rison of U.S. troops, but are nonetheless friendly to and necessary 
for American interests. Indeed, almost all of friendly Indochina is 
affected, with Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia being of particular 
significance. Accordingly, the time has come for policymakers to begin 
to formulate a post-reduction security strategy for Indochina. 
Regrettably, the United States has yet to comprehend the full im- 
plications of Pacific Rim troop reductions; analysts seem to focus only 
on the viability of the major garrisoned nations in Asia.2 With their 
eyes on NATO, they plan no further than to concede that it is only 
a question of when, not whether, such reductions in America’s Pacific 
forces will take place.3 With respect to Indochina, this European- 
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Army Berlin, 1979-1982. B.A., University of Maryland, 1976; J.D., University of 
Alabama, 1979; LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s School, 1987. Admitted to the 
bars of the Court of Military Appeals and the State of Alabama. 
‘Address by Secretary of State James Baker, US. Foreign Policy Priorities and FY 
1991 Budget Request (Washington, Feb. 1, 1990), reprinted in  U S .  Dep’t of State, Cur- 
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style appraisal is insufficient for two reasons. First, the friendly coun- 
tries of Southeast Asia will still require some form of a military um- 
brella to deter external aggression from neighboring totalitarian 
states. “In Asia either there has been no movement toward political 
openness (Mongolia and North Korea), or there has been some pro- 
gress followed by a retreat (China and Vietnam).’I4 Second, unlike 
America’s industrialized allies, many of these developing countries 
are embroiled in all of the internal problems associated with low in- 
tensity conflict (LIC)5 environments. 
While South Korea and Japan may be capable of maintaining an 
adequate self-defense posture once reductions are made (as is ex- 
pected from our NATO partners), Southeast Asia will not. Thus, in 
connection with Indochina, there looms a dilemma that mandates 
that the United States accomplish something at which it has never 
been very successful-constructing a comprehensive security 
strategy capable of protecting the stability of developing countries, 
many in potential or actual LIC environments, without the use of 
a large standing armed force. In the absence of a security strategy 
capable of meeting this requirement, it is inevitable that there will 
be a significant deterioration in American strategic interests in 
Southeast Asia. If these countries “do not believe that we intend 
to remain fully engaged, it will seriously hamper our efforts in other 
areas such as . . . the settlement of regional conflicts.”6 
Concentrating on security assistance, combined training military 
exercises, and the peacetime use of special forces (SF), this article 
will survey these “force multipliers” as essential elements of a coor- 
dinated U.S. approach towards Southeast Asia. 
4Scalapino, Asia and the United States: The Challenges Ahead, 69 Foreign Affairs 
5The term “low intensity conflict” is defined as 
89 (1990). 
Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below con- 
ventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It fre- 
quently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. 
Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is 
waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, 
and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, general- 
ly in the Third World, but contain certain regional and global security 
implications. 
Dep’t of Army & Dep’t of Air Force, Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low 
Intensity Conflict, December 1989, at 14 [hereinafter FM 100-201. 
%lark, FY 1990 Foreign Assistance Request for East Asia and the R m f i c ,  DISAM 
Journal, Summer 1989, at 49. 
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11. WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES 
Since President Jimmy Carter’s 1978 public announcement that he 
was considering major American troop reductions in the Republic 
of Korea, planners in the Pentagon and Congress alike have grap- 
pled with the consequences such cuts would have on U.S. military- 
political interests in the Asian Basin.’ While the Reagan era buildup 
of military strength dispelled those concerns for a time,s it is now 
generally anticipated that not only will significant reductions in U.S. 
military personnel and equipment take place in the Republic of Korea 
within the next decade, but also that deep cuts may well occur 
throughout much of the Pacific Rim area.g Moreover, this is not due 
solely to the current upheavals in the Communist Bloc or other Soviet 
peace initiatives!O Prior to the apparent fundamental changes in the 
Soviet Union, leaders such as General Louis C. Menetrey, the Com- 
mander of U.S. forces in Korea, predicted that major cuts in Korean- 
based forces would take place before the turn of the century!’ 
Confronted with fiscal concerns at home, America seems more 
open than ever to disengagement of its overseas forces. As one ex- 
pert at the Cat0 Institute recently noted, “it is hard to see how the 
United States can remain competitive when it affords so many allies 
an artificial advantage by allowing them to concentrate their 
resources on civilian investment and to commit the bulk of their 
government research and development monies to nonmilitary pur- 
poses.’ ’12 
Finally, much of the impetus for such reductions comes from the 
T h e  United States maintains approximately 43,000 troops in South Korea with a 
current yearly cost of about $2.6 billion. In 1978 President Carter indicated that he 
intended to cut that number to 14,000, but pressure from both Congress and the Pen- 
tagon defeated the initiative. In September 1989 a proposal to cut troop strengths in 
Korea was defeated in the Senate by a 65 to 34 vote. Mann, News Analysis; Stance 
Shifts on U S  Fbrces i n  S Korea, L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1989, at  A18, col. 1. Cutbacks 
for 1990, however, will see the withdrawal of at  least 5,000 U.S. troops. Sanger, Seoul 
Officials See Accord on U S  Troop Cut, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1990, at  A15, col. 1. 
Wee generally Arms Control Association, Arms Control and National Security 33-37 
(1989). 
T h e  Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently studying U S .  commitments in the Pacific 
Rim. US troops could leave South Korea i n  10 years, 12 Jane’s Defense Weekly 328 
(1989) [hereinafter US troops]. See also Bandow, Leaving Korea, Foreign Policy, Winter 
‘Osee Rogers, Glasnost and hes t ro ika:  A n  Evaluution of the Gorbachm Revolution 
and Its Opportunities for the West, 16 Denver J. of Int’l Law & Pol’y 209, 209-46 (1988). 
W S  troops, supra note 9, at 328. 
I2Bandow, supra note 9, at 90. 
1989-90. 
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Asians themselves, and justifiably  SO!^ As the Asian Tigers14 flex their 
political and economic might, the message that was old when Rome 
was a Republic is heard once again-no nation desires to have foreign 
troops stationed indefinitely on its territory. The questionable tenure 
of American bases in the Philippines15 and the recurring local pro- 
tests over U S .  facilities in Korea and Okinawa certainly reflect this 
attitude. For the most part, however, these calls for military autono- 
my are not so much a rejection of the United States as an important 
ally as they are a reflection of a growing sense of independence and 
nationalism made possible by unprecedented economic expansionj6 
Thriving for decades under the American security umbrella, the gar- 
risoned nations have grown into significant world powers in their 
own right. In general, they have been grateful. 
When reductions do take place, Americans will not be departing 
as hated occupying forces. One can be assured that the host coun- 
tries will retain a strong desire for continued American military con- 
tact and support in some fashion. In this respect, the United States 
has established a dialogue with its allies that will survive troop 
withdrawals. Pullouts will not be made in the middle of the night. 
In the most simplistic terms, a combination of changing percep- 
tions about the Soviet threat and the growing economic and military 
strength of the nations where American forces are currently sta- 
tioned make force and budget reductions extremely attractive to both 
the public and Congress. However disastrous this prospect may seem 
to some, most of the Asian nations that currently garrison U S .  troops 
will probably be able to develop a more than adequate self-defense 
posture, given sufficient lead time. 
13Richburg, Southeast Asia Debates US. Security Umbrella, Washington Post, Aug. 
31, 1989, at A18, col. 1. See also Bandow, supra note 9. 
14The four Asian Tigers are South Korea, ’hiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Each 
of these nations has achieved a real growth rate in the 8-12 percent range by embrac- 
ing capitalist economic theory. Thailand and the Philippines, presently enjoying s i w i -  
cant, but lesser economic growth, may soon become the fifth and sixth nations to 
join the Asian Tigers. Association of the United States Army, Change and Challenge 
- The Search for  Peace in 1988: A Global Assessment 34 (1989) [hereinafter Global 
Assessment]. 
15Leases on Subic Bay Naval Station and Clark Air Base expire in 1991. Negotiations 
for an extension “are expected to be more acrimonious than in the past because of 
a growing sense of nationalism among many Filipinos who see the bases as an affront 
to the country’s sovereignty.” Sowiet Pullout Could Spark Debate in U S  - 2 American 
Bases in Philippines at Issue, Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1990, at A16, col. 1. 
I6Address by Robert M. Kimmitt, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, The US. and 
Japan: Defining Our Global Partnership, Foreign Correspondenls Club of Japan 
(Tokyo, Oct. 9. 1989), reprinted in U.S. Dep’t of State, Current Policy, No. 1221 (Nov. 
1989). 
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111. STABILITY FOR THE 
NON-GARRISONED NATIONS 
The most difficult issue will revolve around providing a viable 
methodology for protecting the stability and security of the less 
powerful non-garrisoned states in the region. Of critical importance 
are the remaining pro-western powers in Southeast Asia. Situated 
at or near important sea lanes that link the Pacific to Africa and 
Europe, the most geostrategic countries are Thailand, Malaysia, In- 
donesia, Singapore, and BruneiJ7 With the industrial revolution rapid- 
ly shifting into the region, it is almost axiomatic that all of these na- 
tions are vital to the economic and political interests of the United 
States, and yet no U.S. military bases rest on their soil!E 
Having witnessed closely the practical effects of the “domino prin- 
ciple,” many of these developing countries, to put it mildly, are ex- 
tremely apprehensive about American withdrawals from the soil of 
their neighbors. A recent conference in Maui, sponsored by the Coun- 
cil on Foreign Relations and the Asia Pacific Association, summed 
up the concern: “[A] withdrawal of the United States from Pacific 
concerns would be intensely destabilizing. There are certain roles, 
particularly the buffering role of US.  military forces . . . , which only 
the United States can undertake in a way that is perceived as non- 
threatening by Asian nations.”Ig All of the friendly non-garrisoned 
states in Indochina share “an interest in maintaining a robust 
American presence in Asia in order to balance other ‘close in’ powers 
which they fear most.”20 
Currently, the sole collective bond in Indochina is membership in 
a loosely organized six nation economic alliance called the Associa- 
tion of Southeast Nations (ASEAN).21 To date, Indochina has found 
protection and comfort in the shadow of the large American presence 
cast from other parts of the Pacific. 
T h e  governments of Thailand and Malaysia are constitutional monarchies. Indonesia 
and Singapore are republics, and Brunei is a constitutional sultanate. Only Thailand 
has any form of security understandings with the United States, dating from the Manila 
Pact of 1952 and the Rusk-Thanat communique of 1962. See Global Assessment, supra 
note 14, at 40. 
Wlark, supra note 6, at 47-48. 
l9Maui, supra note 2, at  14. 
20Zagoria, Soviet Policy i n  East Asia: A New Beginning?, 68 Foreign Affairs 121 
ZIThe Association of Southeast Asian Nations was created in 1967 with the signing 
of the Bangkok Declaration. The original five members are Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam became the sixth member 
in 1984. Although a small secretariat is located in Jakarta, ASEAN is an association 
with limited authority. U S .  Dep’t of State, Gist, June 1988 [hereinafter ASEANJ. 
(1988-89). 
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A .  EXTERNAL THREAlS 
Faced with the Soviet Union’s military complex at Cam Ranh Bay,22 
surrounding hostile totalitarian regimes prone to military adven- 
t u r i ~ m , ~ ~  and the volatile situations in Cambodiaz4 and Burma,z5 these 
handful of fled- powers essentially constitute the forward defense 
of the United States for Southeast Asia. Since the withdrawal of U S .  
forces from Vietnam in 1975, they have played a vital role in the 
American policy of containing the Soviet Union and its clients. In 
his 1989 trip to Singapore, Vice President Quayle reaffirmed the 
necessity of checking Soviet influence from the region, indicating 
that the “containment of Soviet power remains a cornerstone of 
American foreign policy.”z6 In addition, the Leninist states through- 
out Asia show no signs of moving towards democratic pluralism; they 
too must be checked. “The strong prospect for the intermediate 
future is that the Asian Leninist states, rather than moving toward 
parliamentary government, will evolve toward an authoritarian- 
pluralist system.”z7 
%am Ranh Bay is located in Vietnam. It is the largest permanent Soviet naval base 
outside the Soviet Union and is considered a threat to regional stability. See Dep’t 
of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat (1988). 
23With the fourth largest military in the world, the central concern has always been 
Vietnam. A1 Bernstein, former chairman of the strategy department at the Naval War 
College in Newport, Rhode Island, has also pointed out that a continuing military 
presence in Southeast Asia will be necessary to deter military adventurism by other 
local nations. Ingwerson, US Grapples With How to Respond to New World Scene, Chris- 
tian Science Monitor, Dec. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Professor Bernstein is currently the 
Assistant Undersecretary for Policies and Planning in the State Department. Telephone 
interview with Professor Bernstein, Office of the State Department (Jan. 8, 1989). 
See also Bernstein, Mm Aquino and the Joe Kapp S y n d m ,  National Interest, Winter 
1989-90, at 79. But see Vause, Doing Business With Vietnam - Prospects and Con- 
c m f o r  the 199Os, 4 Florida Int’l L.J. 231 (1989). 
Z4Cambodia, also known as Kampuchea, is still reeling after a decade of inconclusive 
warfare. Although Vietnam allegedly withdrew most of its occupation forces in late 
1989, Communist military and economic support continues to Hanoi’s surrogate regime 
in Phnom Penh led by Hun Sen and Heng Samrin. Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge and other 
competing factions are attempting to gain control of the country; attempts to form 
a coalition govenunent have been unsuccessful. The United States supports those forces 
loyal to Prince Sihanouk. Address by Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Cambodia and Vietnam: Trapped in a n  Eddy of History?, 
International Symposium on the Future of U.S.-Indochina Relations (Sept. 8, 1989), 
reprinted in U.S. Dep’t of State, Current Policy, No. 1206 (Oct. 1989). 
2The nation has a Marxist-Leninist heritage. The present military junta led by General 
Saw Maung took power in a bloody coup in September 1988. Although Saw Maung 
ended the 26 year dictatorship of Ne Win and changed the name of the country to 
Mayanmar, the form of government is still totalitarian. Popular elections in May 1990 
have not translated into a shift of power. 
26Address by Vice President Quayle, American Leadership in the Pacific, American 
Business Council (Singapore, May 3, 1989), reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, 
August 1989, at 52. 
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Indeed, the Soviets have yet to undertake any meaningful force 
reductions in the Pacific Rim;28 nor have they reduced their military 
aid and support to regimes hostile to American interests.29 Additional- 
ly, other dark clouds on the horizon add credence to the proposition 
that these nations are vital to American strategic interests. With the 
coming incorporation of Hong Kong, and perhaps even Macao and 
’hiwan, into Communist China, the U.S. can ill afford to jeopardize 
its ties to these remaining pivotal states.30 “Glasnost” may resound 
for now on the Berlin Wall, but the voices are silent in Tiananmen 
Square. It is only through the continued autonomy of key states such 
as Thailand that the West can be assured that the balance of power 
will be maintained in Southeast Asia. 
B. INTERNAL THREAlS 
In assessing the external threats to the sovereignty and security 
of these developing countries, planners must also understand that 
many of these nations are beset with all of the equally critical inter- 
nal problems associated with LIC environments. Thus, there remains 
a continued need not only to assist the incumbent governments in 
combating overt demonstrations of LIC such as terrorism, but also 
to help neutralize the various economic, social, and political sources 
that often promote conflict. The dynamic factors associated with LIC 
include “discontent, poverty, violence, and instability . . . . [Tlhese 
interact to create an environment conducive to LIC.”31 
Even to the optimist, this is not an easy task; critical domestic 
troubles are often massive in scope and have plagued many of these 
countries almost from their entrance into the modern era. It is no 
28Gorbachev’s 1988 offer to abandon Cam Ranh Bay if the U.S. pulled out of the 
Philippines was rejected. In January 1990 the Soviets claimed to have unilaterally 
removed all MIG-23 fighter aircraft and some TU-16 bombers from Cam Ranh Bay. 
This posturing is seen by some as increasing pressure on the U.S. to reduce its military 
forces in the region. Soviets Said to Withdraw Fighters and Bombers From Vietnam 
Base, Washington Post, Jan. 18, 1990, a t  A6, col. 1. 
29Warner, No Change in Soviet Military Buildup, Pacific Defense Reporter, March 
1989, a t  40. See also Edmundson, The Carnival in Berlin, Officer Review, January 
1990. 
3oSee generally Mushkat, The International Legal Status of Hong Kong Under f is t -  
Transitional Rule, 10 Hous. J. Int’l L. 1 (1987). Efforts to incorporate Taiwan into 
Communist China are also being proposed. In June 1989 representatives of the Republic 
of China on ’hiwan and the People’s Republic of China met in Tokyo to discuss the 
“political, economic, social, and cultural issues that divide them.” At the conclusion 
of the conference, the participants agreed that there was “only one China and an- 
ticipate[d] its ultimate reunification.” International Security Council, Symposium on 
Bace and Security in the 7hiwan Straight 17 (1989). 
31FM 100-20, para. 1-3. 
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secret, for example, that Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia are faced 
with a collage of serious domestic challenges that reflect both the 
causes and manifestations of LIC, including refugees, drug cartels, 
ethnic strife, bandits, terrorists, and even low level insurgencies. Left 
unchecked, these internal weaknesses provide fertile ground for un- 
friendly elements in their quest to endanger, destabilize, or even con- 
trol the incumbent governments. 
IV. FORMULATING A POLICY APPROACH FOR 
U.S. SUPPORT OF INDOCHINA 
If these non-garrisoned countries are strategically important, afor- 
tiori, provisions must be taken to guarantee that they are protected 
from the inevitable negative repercussions caused by force retrench- 
ments in the Asian Basin. Even from a strict Machiavellian viewpoint, 
ignoring the continuing benefits of freedom and prosperity to In- 
dochina, the United States must find a methodology to maintain at 
least a status quo. Until these nations are able to defend themselves, 
either individually or through the formation of an effective collec- 
tive security confederation, strategic needs have not grown smaller. 
Even to those who predict a reduced single threat from the Soviets, 
the U S .  must still project itself as a dynamic balancer in the regional 
strifes. 
If external threats attract the greatest attention once the U.S. 
begins a standing down of forces, establishing a strategy that can 
simultaneously address LIC issues will offer the greatest overall 
challenge. Although some form of military support will most certainly 
be required to deter outside aggression, bullets will not solve 
domestic troubles. What, then, should be the central fulcrum of the 
U S .  policy for protecting these non-garrisoned countries? 
A. JAPAN’S ROLE 
The first issue to address in the search for an Indochina security 
formula is the frequently raised notion that Japan can offer the 
necessary protection to Southeast Asia by increasing it’s military 
prowess, that America need not take the lead. This is not a popular 
idea, either in the region or in Japan itself.32 Given its peace con- 
stitution, Japan has shown no predilection towards accepting this 
3ZSneider, Japan ShunsLeading World Role, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 27, 1989. 
at 11, col. 1. See also Japan Daily News, Feb. 22, 1990, at 1. Japanese Foreign Minister 
Taro Nakayama characterized the U.S. military role in the Asian-Pacific region as “un- 
changeable and essential.” 
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function. The chief proponents for such a role are in the United 
States. On the other hand, Indochina emphatically rejects a Japanese- 
centered security umbrella. Probably speaking in general for the rest 
of the Asian community, a South Korean official recently noted that 
“you can ask them [Japan] to share the burden, but the strategic 
and military role played by the US. in this region should remain.”33 
Presumably, part of the explanation for Japan’s timidity and In- 
dochina’s recalcitrance rests in their respective World War I1 experi- 
ences. 
There is also the matter of Chinese and Soviet responses to the 
efficacy of Japanese militarization. The Maui conference revealed 
this concern: 
Were Japan to go “autonomous,” alarms would go off all over 
Asia, prompting China, in particular, to make dispositions to 
meet a potential threat from Japan and spurring a Soviet 
response as well. The region would pass from the stability sup- 
ported by the Japan-US. alliance to one of maneuver designed 
to check what would be called everywhere, regardless of Japan’s 
intent, resurgent mi l i t a r i~m.~~  
It must be emphasized that Japan is a strong ally of the United 
States and does not seek to challenge America’s leadership role in 
Indochina, only to support that function.35 For the immediate future, 
Japan’s influence is likely to remain an economic While the 
US. will undoubtedly receive Japanese help in sharing and suppor- 
ting a Southeast Asian strategy, the nucleus and pivot of a workable 
security model will have to be supplied by the United States. In order 
to retain control of operations, however, the U S .  will still have to 
shoulder the majority of the 
B. THE AMERICAN SOLDIER 
To assert that those opposed to American interests will view the 
U.S. military reductions in Asia as a sign of weakened American 
resolve would merely be to state the obvious. The real issue is one 
of determining how antagonists will react to the proposed replace- 
331d. 
34Maui, supra note 2, at 16. 
35See generally Zagoria, Soviet Policy in East Asia: A New Beginning?, 68 Foreign 
36Kimmitt, supra note 16. 
37Remarks of Vice Admiral Henry Mauz, Jr., Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1990. at A32, 
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ment strategy. Thus, the quintessential criteria for a successful In- 
dochina policy is that it must convince hostile forces that American 
support is genuine and continuous; the new strategy must go beyond 
merely beefing up Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks (PWRS) in Indo- 
china. 
At the same time, however, the policy must not violate the range 
of reasonable responses. The security model must abide by what 
Richard Falk describes as a part of the international “rules of the 
game.”38 Rules of the game stem from standards of expected behavior, 
not necessarily of legal origins, a departure from which might cause 
a disproportionate escalation in tensions or an unwanted retaliation 
from one’s adversaries. For instance, if the U.S. proposed to solve 
the Indochina support question by introducing nuclear weapons in- 
to the region, this would violate the rules of the game to such a 
degree as to prompt “adversely affected actors . . . to make or 
threaten a credible response.”39 Indeed, if the U.S. model is deemed 
too drastic, hostile forces might attempt to assert claims of “an- 
ticipatory self-defense” in initiating uses of force. Thus, the model 
must fall within the norm of foreseeable expectations; the actions 
must clearly represent a purely defensive posture for Indochina. 
Paradoxically, because the adversaries of Western values will ap- 
preciate nothing less as they witness this general reduction in the 
garrisoned nations, the modus vivendi of any Indochina model must 
directly emphasize the use of American soldiers performing high 
visibility activities on the soil of host nations. If only to communicate 
American steadfastness, the requirement to include U. S. soldiers is 
absolutely fundamental. Any policy that does not incorporate the 
use of American troops is like the squeamish man’s response to the 
blood drive: “I’ll give money, but not my blood.” Without it, the signal 
is certain-commitment is limited; the U S .  has abandoned Southeast 
Asia. 
The caveat, of course, is that great care must be taken in how troops 
will be employed, and in what numbers. This means not only abiding 
by the rules of the game, but also that appropriate sensitivity must 
be afforded to the needs of both the sending and receiving states. 
The days when the United States could unilaterally “invite” itself 
into a third state are past. Post U.N. Charter developments in inter- 
national law, both customary and codified, make such an ethnocen- 
38R. F’alk, F. Kratochwil, and S. Mendlovitz, International Law: A Contemporary 
39Zd. 
Perspective 134 (1985). 
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tricity totally untenable. ‘‘The principle of non-intervention in in- 
ternal affairs is, in effect, an attempt to limit outside neo-colonial 
attempts to influence events in other countries for the interests of 
the intervening country.”40 
1. Indochina’s Perspective 
Requiring a tremendous amount of diplomatic suave and pliant, 
the U.S. will have to advance a strategy for the use of its personnel 
that is acceptable to a majority of the friendly Southeast Asian coun- 
tries. To focus solely on one or two of these nations could very well 
be detrimental to U.S. presence in the region as a whole. Malaysia 
and Indonesia, for example, reacted with open hostility to Singapore’s 
1989 offer to provide the U.S. with permanent military facilities as 
replacements for the bases in the Republic of the phi lip pine^.^^ While 
both Malaysia and Indonesia are considered friendly, and eagerly par- 
ticipate in various bilateral programs, when it comes to discussing 
U.S. military involvement in the region each has unique political and 
social propensities that cannot be ignored. 
A general assessment of Indochina’s attitude regarding the employ- 
ment of American forces reveals at least three fundamental con- 
siderations. Taken together, these factors make it highly doubtful that 
the larger countries of Thailand, Malaysia, or Indonesia would easi- 
ly agree to a plan that called for the permanent basing of anything 
but the smallest number of American forces. First and most 
prevalent, no one state desires another to gain the disproportionate 
military advantage that a large scale U.S. presence would afford. 
Second, the same spirit of self-determination and nationalism that 
speaks for withdrawing troops from the states that currently quarter 
them is just as strong in the ASEAN nations.42 Americans cannot af- 
ford to be provincial in this matter; history has shown that a spark 
of nationalistic fervor can flame an uncontrollable fire, transform- 
ing otherwise reasonable citizens into anti-American mobs. A classic 
case in point occurred in Thailand in 1973, when widespread civil 
disobedience erupted in Bangkok in part because of the incumbent 
government being perceived as a “lackey” to the American forces 
40Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of t h  
“Richburg, supra note 13. Singapore made the offer on August 4, 1989. Singapore’s 
42Clark, supra note 6, a t  14. 
Government, British Yearbook of International Law, LVI 252 (1985). 
Leader Says U S  Vital Tb Region, Washington Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at 2, col. 1. 
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then stationed in the During the remainder of that decade, 
bloody riots by competing factions brought the nation to the brink 
of anarchy.44 
Planners must understand that Southeast Asia has had a long and 
sometimes troubled chronology in dealing with Western powers. 
While the West has undeniably brought substantial benefits to the 
region, too often many have viewed these contacts as merely out- 
side exploitation. To be successful, the US. will have to treat In- 
dochina as a partner, rather than as a client; commitments must be 
binding and fulfilling, not merely cold business t ran~act ions.~~ Indeed, 
a model that even hints at colonialism cannot be reconciled against 
the strong expressions of independence and autonomy that now 
permeate these nations. The desire to be treated as equal sovereigns 
and the basing of large amounts of foreign troops, no matter how 
benevolent, are no longer consistent. Therefore, absent a serious 
escalation in either the LIC environment or direct external threats 
to their sovereignty, host governments will find it very difficult to 
support the deployment of significant numbers of U.S. troops. They 
know that to do so could very well threaten their own legitimacy. 
The third consideration is a regional one, reflected in the recently 
expressed ASEAN goal of establishing a “Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality” in Southeast Asia.46 Based loosely on the repudia- 
tion of the use of force expressed in article 2(4) of the United Na- 
tions Charter,47 this unified expression of neutrality would imply that 
any proposal to establish fixed American facilities would be met with 
immediate resistance. In fact, in mid-1989 the Interparliamentary 
Organization of ASEAN once again rejected a proposal to create even 
an ASEAN collective defense As is often the case in collec- 
tive organizations, however, what nations proclaim in unison is not 
necessarily an accurate indication of what they say in private. Con- 
sidering ASEAN’s goal of neutrality, it is telling that there has never 
been a direct call for American withdrawals from any part of Asia, 
not even from the Philippines where many Filipinos are increasing- 
ly demanding that the U.S. depart.49 
43Lobe, 14 Monograph Series in World Affairs, bk. 2,  United Statesh’ational Securz- 
t y  Policy and Aid to the Thailand Police (1977). 
4 4 ~  
451d. at 112. 
46Richburg, supra note 13. 
47U.N. Charter art. 2,  par. 4. 
48ASEAN, supra note 21. 
49See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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The nations of Indochina are pragmatic; they recognize that they 
owe their prosperity and perhaps even a measure of their stability 
to the general security umbrella of American protection. ASEAN may 
pay the necessary lip service to aspirations of non-alignment, but 
the separate member-states are wholly cognizant that once that um- 
brella begins to fold, they will be left in an uncomfortable power 
vacuum. 
It is not surprising that individual expressions of this anxiety are 
already rumbling throughout Southeast Asia. In fact, it was this very 
concern that prompted Singapore to make its unilateral proposal to 
the U.S. for permanent military facilities.60 While the offer was not 
palatable to some of his neighbors, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew cer- 
tainly encapsulated the general consensus of the region-even if the 
U.S. draws down its forces in the Pacific Rim, it should nonetheless 
continue to guarantee the balance of power in Southeast Asia.51 
Another Singapore official observed that, at a bare minimum, “[a] 
physical presence counts, even a symbolic one.”52 
In short, the majority of the nations in Indochina want the benefits 
that a permanent U.S. basing would bring, but not the base itself. 
If Singapore’s offer was criticized because it smacked of colonialism, 
and was otherwise insensitive to the rest of the region, at least it 
realistically recognized that the pledge of American protection can 
be fulfilled only through the use of American soldiers. As a starting 
point in formulating a strategy, then, American planners can an- 
ticipate that a limited physical presence of some sort would be viewed 
as necessary and acceptable, once American withdrawals occurred 
in the Asian Basin. If the presence is couched in terms of being non- 
permanent, or if permanent, only minimal, planners should envision 
enthusiastic concurrence throughout friendly Indochina. 
2. America’s Perspective 
From the perspective of the sending state, Congress, as well as the 
American people, should view the strategy as suitable and necessary. 
As to suitability, the question is primarily one of funding. Eagerly 
anticipating the so called ‘‘peace dividend” associated with overseas 
withdrawals, the U.S. will be reluctant to funnel the massive amounts 
50See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
S?Southeast Asia Debates U S  Security Umbrella, Washington Post, Aug. 21, 1989, 
at  A18. 
szZd. 
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of monies that are required to create new facilities. Demands for an 
alternative solution will gravitate toward a plan that is far less ex- 
pensive. 
As to necessity, there are those who will never be convinced of 
the wisdom of involving U.S. forces in Indochina. The great fear is 
termed “entanglement”; but really it is only a reflection of America’s 
inability to plan in terms of years, not months, in dealing with 
developing states. The roots of this phenomenon are deep, resting 
in the traditional view of the military as an instrument for use in 
conventional warfare only.53 Thus, Americans are extremely ap- 
prehensive concerning the use of armies to combat LIC or about get- 
ting involved in “dirty little wars.” Because of this fear, validated 
in the mind of the public by the war in Vietnam, calls for the 
establishment of a large permanent garrison in Indochina or for the 
use of a substantial force structure would probably face an impossi- 
ble battle in gaining congressional backing. Attempts to invoke Presi- 
dent Kennedy’s philosophy that armies could be used to help “build 
countries” would persuade none but the already persuaded.54 
From a funding view, as well as that of a conceptional analysis, 
a necessary policy, i.e., a saleable policy, will have to rely on a limited 
troop structure. There is little doubt that the size of the American 
force in a Southeast Asian strategy will have to be minimal, regardless 
of whether it is garrisoned or not. This is largely a political battle 
between Congress and the President, but certainly the smaller the 
size of the force employed, the easier approval will be achieved. 
Finally, in order to facilitate congressional acceptance and to en- 
sure simplified implementation, the new policy will have to be con- 
structed around existing approaches for projecting American military 
support that do not necessarily require the stationing of U.S. troops. 
Considering the inherent bureaucratic aversion to change, coupled 
in this case with the necessary interplay of the Congress and State 
Department, any proposal that is naive enough to seek to “break 
new ground” is doomed to failure. Are there such existing ap- 
proaches? 
53Walsh, A Dzfferent Lesson From the War in Afghanistan, Military Review, Dec. 
1989, at 83-84. 
54See De Pauw and Luz, The Role Of the lbtal Army  in Military Ciuic Action and 
Humanitarian Assistance, Strategic Studies Institute, U S .  Army War College (1989). 
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V. CURRENT INITIATIVES USED To PROJECT 
AMERICAN SUPPORT 
A mutual consensus concerning an optimal strategy that accom- 
modates and reconciles the desires of both the U.S. and Indochina 
would call for some form of an American presence on the ground. 
However, that presence would undoubtedly be a restricted one. Con- 
sequently, the overall policy will have to find ways to compensate 
for size, because to be successful, the strategy must still be capable 
of providing at least some measure of external security while 
operating within the complexities of a LIC environment. 
An examination of the current programs that are used to project 
American strategic commitments makes it apparent that an accep- 
table Indochina model could be drawn from tested ideas, with some 
modification. Besides the actual stationing of military personnel in 
a friendly or allied country, the United States has three available 
methods to send the message of American support. Categorized as 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID), these are security assistance, com- 
bined training military exercises, and the use of special forces in 
peacetime operations. 55 In general, FID activities are executed 
through the particular geographic unified commanders, who are, of 
course, familiar with the unique problems of the countries in their 
area of responsibility. 
A.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
1. Description and Purpose of Security Assistance 
Security assistance activities are carried out predominately under 
the auspices of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA),56 the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA),57 and pertinent annual appropriation acts. The 
FAA was passed in 1961 as a means of providing various types of 
economic and military assistance to countries considered key Ameri- 
can allies or friends. The functional aspect of security assistance is 
easily defined. It is divided into four principal categories of aid: food; 
development; military; and direct cash payments under an economic 
support fund (ESF). To the greatest extent possible, these initiatives 
are administered with only the use of a limited number of US. per- 
sonnel situated within the host nation. 
55For a discussion of the statutory prohibitions relating to FID, see International 
Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, The Operational Law 
Handbook, chap. 3, sec. I11 C (1989) [hereinafter OPLAWHundbook]. 
5622 U.S.C. § 2301 (1988). 
5722 U.S.C. 3 2751 (1988). 
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The specific purpose of security assistance was summed up by the 
former Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, in his annual report 
to the Congress on the 1990/91 biennial budget: “Security assistance 
exists to facilitate the pursuit of our national security objectives.”58 
A closer synthesis of the various activities reveals the following broad 
goals: assist our friends and allies to defend against aggression and 
instability; promote regional stability; strengthen the economies of 
key states; and maintain friendly military/political relations.59 The 
significance of security assistance is therefore twofold: operating to 
ward off external threats and assisting developing countries to cope 
with internal troubles. 
a. Security Assistance as a LIC Weapon 
Carlucci noted that security assistance ‘‘provides the principal 
policy instrument for assisting nations engaged in low-intensity con- 
flict.”60 At least in theory, the U.S. has recognized that to effective- 
ly neutralize the social and economic problems associated with LIC 
environments, specific programs concentrating on specific plights 
must be utilized. The cumulative impact of such social and economic 
assistance should play an integral part in the long term elimination 
of the factors that foment domestic instability. Aid directed at agri- 
cultural and rural development, population planning, construction 
activities, and balance-of-payment deficits has long been seen as a 
viable tool in blunting many of the underlying causes of LIC. 
Other programs are aimed not at the causes, but directly at counter- 
ing those violent or otherwise criminal acts associated with the lower 
spectrum of the LIC scale.61 Seeking to alter the policies of the in- 
digenous government, activities such as kidnapping, sabotage, and 
assassination should be classified as criminal, if not terrorist acts.62 
While the perpetrators will invariably claim that they are “soldiers” 
(i.e. insurgents) and entitled to protection under international law, 
~ 
58Carlucci, Security Assistance and International Armaments Cooperation, Annual 
Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial 
Budget and FY 1990-1994 Defense Programs 67 (1989). 
5 9 ~ .  
‘j0Id. at 63. 
W e e  generally, Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College, Theater Planning 
and Operations for Low Intensity Conflict Environments (September 1986). 
‘j2Army Reg. 525-13, The Army Terrorism Counteraction Program, 4 Jan. 1988, at 
16, defines terrorism as “[tlhe calculated use of violence or the threat of violence 
to attain goals, political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through in- 
timidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often 
symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate vic- 
tims.” 
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they have no status under either the Geneva or Hague Conventions 
and should be treated, in every respect, as domestic criminals.63 Ad- 
ditionally, there is no prohibition under international law against a 
third state assisting the host government in dealing with those who 
foment internal disorder, as long as this group has not attained some 
degree of international status.64 One legislative program designed to 
assist law enforcement capabilities in a developing country is the An- 
titerrorism Assistance65 statute. 
b. Security Assistance Used to Discourage External Aggression 
The military component to security assistance is geared predomi- 
nantly toward helping provide a defense shield against outside ag- 
gression. It consists of four major programs. The first is the Military 
Assistance Program (MAP),66 a grant program providing a develop- 
ing country with the ability to obtain defense articles and services 
from the United States at no cost. Operating on financial grants and 
credits, MAP is an institutional recognition that many countries are 
unable to adequately provide for their own defense. MAP funds may 
also be used by the host nation to purchase items offered through 
other assistance programs, giving the states the appropriate flexibility 
to determine what items or services are most immediately required. 
Currently overtaking the function of the MAP program, the second 
component is the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP). 
Although designed initially to extend credits to third world nations 
and not to operate on grants, FMPF has essentially evolved into a 
grant initiative. 6s 
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS)69 program is the third approach. 
FMS is administered under the provisions of the AECA and allows 
qualified countries to buy American military defense articles and ser- 
63McCullough, International and Criminal Law Issues in tke Achille Lauro Inci- 
dent: A Functional Analysis, 36 Naval L. Rev. 53, 55 (1986). But see United States 
v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988). 
64R. Erickson, Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-Sponsored Interna- 
tional Terrorism 69 (1989); Schachter, Th.e Extraterritorial Use of Force Against %- 
rorism Bases, 11 Houston J. Int’l L. 309, 310 (1989). 
6522 U.S.C. J 2349aa (1988). Under the Antiterrorism Assistance statute, the U S .  
provides training and equipment to assist third states in dealing with hostage situa- 
tions, implementing security procedures, and handling explosives. 
6622 U.S.C. § 2311-2318 (1988). 
“22 U.S.C. J 2761-2764 (1988). 
6aSamelson, Military Assistance Legislation For Fiscal Year 1990, DISAM Journal, 
6922 U.S.C. J 2761-2762 (1988). 
Winter 1989-90, at 5-6. 
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vices. Because FMS is a sale procedure and not based on grants, it 
also provides an economic benefit to the U.S. 
The final program is the International Military Educational and 
Training (IMET)70 program. IMET is another grant initiative that pro- 
vides for the training of foreign military personnel, usually in the 
United States. The primary purpose of IMET rests in the promotion 
of close working ties with the host country over an extended period 
of time. It opens up channels of communication, helps establish 
friendly relations, maintains American influence, and promotes 
respect for democratic institutions and human rights. 71 
The military dimension of security assistance does, of course, rely 
in part on the use of American soldiers, but only in the limited capaci- 
ty of providing services in the form of training and technical 
assistance. ’ksked to create various training or technical assistance 
teams, such as Mobile Training Teams (MTT),72 the component com- 
mands of the regional unified commands will provide small teams 
of trainers who usually conduct the required training or technical 
assistance within the host nation. As further eviderce of their 
service-oriented role, even in countries where there s -e no status 
of forces agreements (SOFAS),~~ these soldiers are rout nely afford- 
ed the same privileges and immunities as those providzd to the ad- 
ministrative and technical staff of the American embassy in that 
country.74 
2. Criticisms and Effectiveness of Security Assistance 
In describing the benefits of security assistance, Ambassador H. 
Allen Holmes, the Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs in 
the State Department, argues that it is not a philanthropic endeavor, 
but rather a mechanism to save money: “To equal the military ef- 
fect of friends and allies who are on the scene, we would have to 
spend much more on U.S. force structure, mobility, and logistics.”75 
7022 U.S.C. 5 2347 (1988). 
7LCarlucci, supra note 58, at 64. 
72Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Initial Draft) at 11-20 
(June 1989) [hereinafter JCS PUB 3-05j. 
73See generally Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regar- 
ding the Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, 4 U.S.T. 1792; T.I.A.S. 2846; 199 
U.N.T.S. 67 (1951). 
74Members of the administrative and technical staff are usually afforded complete 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and immunity from civil jurisdiction in those cases 
involving acts undertaken in their official capacity. See Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, 22 U.S.T. 3227; T.I.A.S. 7502; 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
75Holmes, FY 1990 Security Assistance Request, Department of State Bulletin, June 
1989, at 53. 
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Ambassador Holmes takes the position that security assistance, pro- 
perly administered, can be an effective substitute for the stationing 
of large numbers of US. forces abroad. “[Ilt is more effective-and 
less costly in the long term-than using U.S. military personnel for 
the same purposes.”76 In practice, however, the effectiveness of 
security assistance in achieving any of its goals is a subject that is 
open to heated debate; it is not the panacea that many portray it 
to be. Directed primarily at Congress, criticisms are legion, including 
inordinate congressional micro-management, a shrinking budget, and 
a lack of continuity. 
One of the most often cited complaints is that of congressional ear- 
marking of funds. Even though security assistance was established 
to be administered by the State Department, by earmarking specific 
dollar amounts for specific countries Congress has essentially taken 
the program out of the hands of the executive branch. From the ear- 
marking of over half of the budget in the mid-l980’s, dollar figures 
for fiscal year 1989 indicate that “49 percent of development aid, 
92 percent of military aid, and 98 percent of the ESF [was] earmarked 
for particular countries.”77 The end result is that about 90% of all 
security assistance funds are directed to only a handful of countries, 
with Israel and Egypt accounting for about half of the total expen- 
ditures. Apparently, one might conclude, Congress does not perceive 
the third world, including Indochina, to be of great strategic signifi- 
cance. 
Furthermore, not content to simply earmark funds, Congress 
engages in the practice of dividing this earmarked aid into functional 
accounts. By creating these functional accounts, Congress regulates 
exactly how the money that it has already earmarked is spent in a 
recipient nation. Legislation may, for example, specify for country 
X that a particular dollar amount be spent only on agricultural 
development. This practice effectively stifles even the smallest 
degree of flexibility for security assistance administrators. 
Other criticisms begin with the basic formulation process of securi- 
ty  assistance and move on to the massive amounts of bureaucratic 
impediments, e.g., reporting and notification requirements. An over- 
view of the implementation process reveals that, in the normal course 
of affairs, security assistance proposals are promulgated at the ex- 
ecutive branch after input from sources as varied as component 
7 ~ .  
77Stanfield, Built without a Blueprint, National Journal, April 8, 1989, a t  848. 
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military commands and departmental agencies in the State Depart- 
ment. Congress then receives and considers these proposals and 
sometimes proposes its own, but is mainly content to exercise con- 
trol of security assistance through its budgetary authority. As the 
requests make their way through this bureaucratic maze, it can take 
up to three years for the initial proposal to actually take shape in 
the host country. While the President does have limited power to 
authorize certain types of assistance on an immediate basis, this is 
an “emergency” authority and cannot be used r ~ u t i n e l y . ~ ~  In most 
cases, getting appropriate assistance to a country in need is often 
too little, too late. Finally, when the aid does arrive, operators are 
faced with a never-ending barrage of reporting requirements spawn- 
ed by congressional oversight. 
Valid concerns also focus on legislative restrictions; each recipient 
country must be deemed to be “eligible” to receive aid. If Congress 
determines that a country is in violation of any number of legislative 
restrictions, it may immediately terminate or curtail assistance. These 
restrictions essentially fall into country-oriented and issue-oriented 
categories. Examples of country-oriented restrictions include the pro- 
hibition on providing security assistance to communist countries79 
or other states that Congress may specifically deem to be hostile to 
the U.S., such as Libyaeso 
Issue-oriented legislation addresses such subjects as states in ar- 
rearage to the U.S. ,*l nuclear transfers,82 states that provide sanc- 
tuary to  terrorist^,^^ and human rights concerns.84 While most of the 
restrictions contain clearly worded triggering mechanisms, some 
passages are typically ambiguous. In dealing with human rights, for 
example, 22 U.S.C. $ 2304 requires that aid be cut off if a nation 
‘‘engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of international- 
ly recognized human rights.”85 Obviously, such a subjective deter- 
mination can be made only by Congress. Other legislative passages 
require administrators to define such terms as ‘‘internal repression” 
in conjunction, for instance, with prohibitions on providing assistance 
to host nation police forces.86 
7822 U.S.C. § 2318, 2364 (1988). 
’O22 U.S.C. 2370(f) (1988). 
80Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
81FOAA 90 618. 
8222 U.S.C. § 2429 (1988). 
8322 U.S.C. § 2371(a)(l) (1988). 
8422 U.S.C. 2304 (a)(2) (1988). 
8522 U.S.C. 2304(a)(3) (1988). 
8622 U.S.C. 2420 (1988). 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, Title 111, 512, 548 [hereinafter FOAA 901. 
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With respect to providing military services, the most sensitive 
restriction requiring the greatest attentiveness from military trainers 
is Section 21(c) (1) of the AECA: “Personnel performing defense ser- 
vices sold under [the AECA] may not perform any duties of a com- 
batant nature, including any duties related to training and advising 
that may engage United States personnel in combat activities out- 
side the United States in connection with the performance of those 
defense services.”87 In short, trainers must scrupulously avoid even 
the appearance of being involved in combatant activities or risk cur- 
tailment of assistance. 
The issue that makes all other concerns academic, however, is the 
problem of the “decreasing budget,” particularly in view of increased 
reporting requirements and congressional earmarking of funds. 
“Since 1985, security assistance has been cut in the aggregate by 
33%.”a8 The current U.S. allocation has been hovering at around $15 
billion per year, with only about one third of the monies going toward 
military assistance programs.89 Indeed, in terms of a proportion of 
national wealth devoted to security assistance, the United States 
ranks next to the last of the industrialized nations.90 Although pro- 
bably as much a question of earmarking of funds, Japan provides 
more economic assistance to Indochina than does the United States.g1 
This trend has caused alarm, reflected again by Secretary Carlucci’s 
remarks to Congress: 
[Security assistance] is a low-cost investment in both our 
defense and foreign policies. By failing to invest, we risk incur- 
ring higher costs in the long-term. F’ailure to help our allies deter 
and combat aggression calls into question the reliability of the 
United States as a security partner, while reducing our allies’ 
effectiveness in sharing the burden of collective security. 
Without adequate assistance, there is great risk that we will 
lose regional influence around the world, and that regional con- 
flicts could expand, necessitating the direct involvement of US.  
forces. g2 
Finally, programs that are funded in developing countries do not 
have the required year-to-year predictability necessary to make them 
8722 U.S.C. 8 2761(c) (1988). 
88Holmes, supra note 75. 
8gZd. See also Samelson, supra note 68, at 2. 
goStanfield, supra note 77, at  850. 
glKimmitt, supra note 16. See also Sneider, supra note 32, at 10-11. 
g2Carlucci, supra note 58. 
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effective. In recent years, entire programs have been severed due 
to inadequate funding.93 Of course, this is also a reflection of the lack 
of clear cut objectives and priorities. Without question, the FAA has 
evolved into a foreign assistance program used to address multiple 
and often ambiguous objectives. One critic has noted that after almost 
three decades “of legislative accretion . . . , [tlhe law now lists 33 
objectives; AID [Agency for International Development] documents 
expand these into 75 priorities.”94 No policy can ever hope to establish 
meaningful direction with such baggage. Trends vacillate between 
various political concerns, to include building up the indigenous in- 
frastructure, providing for basic human needs, encouraging the 
development of free market economies, and providing for self- 
defense needss5 
3. Current Uses of Security Assistance in Indochina 
Considering the criticisms associated with security assistance, what 
impact has the program had on Indochina? The share of security 
assistance monies for Indochina has been negligible. Fiscal year 1989 
amounts provided to the three largest nations in Southeast Asia 
reveal just how stagnant security assistance has become. Indonesia’s 
military assistance was only about $10 million in FMS credits and 
$1.9 million in IMET, while Malaysia’s total assistance amounted to 
about a million dollars in IMET money.g6 During this same period, 
inadequate American military assistance forced Thailand to turn to 
Communist China as an alternate source for purchasing military 
equipment.97 Even so, for fiscal year 1990 overall military aid to 
Thailand has been further cut by 86%, from around a total of $22 
million to about $3 million.9E 
The de minimus funding provided to Indochina has also seriously 
constrained efforts at establishing any real sense of continuity. In- 
deed, if security assistance is viewed as an excellent LIC neutralizer, 
by and large it has been ign0red.9~ The only bright spot rests in the 
IMET initiatives in the region. Over the years, planners have wisely 
chosen to consolidate their efforts into advocating and fostering the 
one program that offers the most return on the dollar. 
9 3 ~ .  
9 5 m  
g4Stanfield, supra note 77,  at 848. 
geJa~obs, US Aid Focus on Asia and the Pacific, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Sept. 30, 
g7Holmes, supra note 75 ,  at 54. 
ggCongress has provided economic aid to refugees in Thailand. U S .  Dep’t of State, 
1989, a t  657, col. 1. 
Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1990, at A7, col. 1. 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Thailand, March 1988, at 8. 
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The vast potential benefits of security assistance have not been 
appreciated in Southeast Asia. Satisfied that its military presence 
throughout the Pacific could accommodate strategic goals,’OO the 
United States has yet to establish a cohesive agenda for the use of 
security assistance in this region. 
4. Security Assistance in the Indochina Model 
a. Security Assistance Components 
Ideally, security assistance could satisfactorily meet many of the 
requirements for an Indochina model: it requires a minimum number 
of U.S. personnel; it assists the host nation’s military structure in 
achieving self-sufficiency; its non-military programs are effective in 
combating LIC causes; and it generally demonstrates a degree of 
American commitment. At present, however, the crippling problems 
associated with security assistance negate much of its potential use 
in an Indochina model. 
Once the reductions in force do occur, however, the U.S. cannot 
hope to maintain its force projection and influence without effec- 
tively employing the full arsenal of security assistance programs. 
Therefore, any proposed model that seeks to incorporate security 
assistance must overcome the treble obstacles of bureaucratic en- 
cumbrances, inadequate funding, and ill-defined priorities. 
b. Making it Viable-The Regional Account Concept 
Attempts to answer the more difficult problems that have so 
fragmented security assistance are currently being made. Perhaps 
realizing that the last major reform of security assistance legislation 
was in 1973, members of Congress do periodically propose haphazard 
amendments. In an effort to redirect money toward Third World coun- 
tries in Latin America, Africa, and Indochina, for example, Senator 
Robert Dole proposed in January 1990 that an across-the-board cut 
in aid be made to the top five recipients “in order to help less-favored 
countries.”101 Even if adopted, however, this is merely an incidental 
effort to limit congressional control of the purse. 
loosee Rep. Jim Kolbe’s comments in Richburg, Soviet Pullout Could Spark Debate 
‘O’Dewar and Kamen, Cut i n  Aid to Israel Proposed, Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1990, 
67 
i n  U S ,  Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1990, at A16, col. 1. 
at A l ,  col. 1. 
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One legislative measure has been enacted in an attempt to elimi- 
nate or minimize congressional earmarking and functional accounts. 
Aimed at putting the program back into the hands of the Administra- 
tion, a “regional account” concept was developed in 1987 for the 
sub-Sahara portion of Africa. Under the plan, Congress agreed simply 
to appropriate $500 million for an African Development Fund. The 
fund was administered by the State Department and directly elimi- 
nated most earmarked and functional set-asides.’02 If this regional 
account concept were used in an Indochina strategy, Congress could 
exercise a regional oversight, while allowing the Administration the 
flexibility of using these funds for those programs and countries it 
deems most appropriate. 
Regardless of the proposal for reform advocated, Congress must 
be persuaded to make security assistance viable. The critical 
challenge of proposing legislation to incorporate an effective security 
assistance package into an Indochina model will require great tenaci- 
ty and clarity of purpose. As a logical starting point, the precedent 
established by the African regional account concept should be 
strenuously argued. In the accompanying area of funding, other 
arguments could draw on the savings associated with troop with- 
drawals from both Europe and the Pacific. Perhaps a quid pro quo 
could be proffered-drawdowns in military forces in the region could 
be exchanged for an increase in the security assistance budget. 
To date, the President has not vigorously proposed reforms, nor 
has Congress seriously focused on an overhaul of the legislation. 
Those who view American foreign policy formulation as “crisis- 
driven,” however, would argue that the stimulus for initiating such 
change has not yet occurred. Absent a recognition that Indochina 
is worth protecting, calls for security assistance to take on the role 
of protector will not be appreciated. 
B. COMBINED TRAINING EXERCISES 
The second method used to project American military support for 
a developing country is combined training exercises. Combined train- 
ing exercises essentially are military “war games” conducted within 
the territory of the host nation. Directed or coordinated by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or a single service secretary, these exercises 
demonstrate that the United States is prepared to assert its man- 
power in the defense of the host nation, should the need arise. As 
a vehicle to discourage external aggression, combined training exer- 
cises are extremely effective. 
lozStanfield, supra note 77, at 848 
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1. As a n  Asset to Combat LIC Issues 
There are other advantages to the use of these exercises as well. 
A U.S. Army War College text points out an important collateral 
benefit: 
In addition to demonstrating tangible US support for the host 
country and providing invaluable readiness training to US 
forces, combined training exercises may also serve as an ex- 
cellent mechanism by which the United States may assist third 
world countries in addressing a number of the social and 
economic conditions endemic to the LIC threat ?03 
Increasingly, component commands have incorporated into military 
exercises various programs geared toward addressing LIC issues. In 
this context, the military has conducted such collateral activities as 
humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), construction projects, and 
military training of foreign forces. These collateral activities must 
be undertaken in accordance with US.  statutory law, how eve^?^^ Pro- 
per budgetary authority has not always been used; exercise opera- 
tion and maintenance (O&M) monies have been expended to finance 
these initiatives?Os After investigating combined training exercises 
in Honduras, the Comptroller General summed up the prohibition 
from two perspectives. First, aside from certain “incidental” con- 
siderations, O&M funds may be used only for the operation and 
maintenance of the American Armed Forces. Second, exercise O&M 
appropriations may not be used “on activities within the scope of 
other funding sources.’06 
The propriety and effectiveness of using these exercises to com- 
bat LIC issues continues to be a source of contention between DOD 
and Congress. While it is inherently the intention of Congress to close- 
ly regulate all collateral activities associated with such maneuvers, 
the legislative branch has exhibited some flexibility, enacting specific 
funding authorities for DOD to carry out HCA and construction pro- 
j e c t ~ ? ~ ~  
Io3Center for Land Warfare, U S .  Army War College, supra note 61, at 19. 
‘040PLAW Handbook, supra note 55. See also 31 U.S.C. Q 1532 (1982) (prohibiting 
the transfer from one appropriation to another except as specifically authorized by law). 
IoGLetter from Comptroller General to Honorable Bill Alexander (30 Jan. 1986) 
(discussing update of 63 Comp. Gen. 422 (1984)) [hereinafter Comp. Gen. Letter]. 
lo70PLAW Handbook, supra note 55.  
1051d. 
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2. Combined Training in Indochina 
The largest Southeast Asian exercise conducted in Indochina is the 
JCS directed Cobra Gold exercise. For nine consecutive years, Cobra 
Gold maneuvers have been conducted throughout the Kingdom of 
Thailand, eqjoying consistent and dependable support from the Thai 
government. This exercise has included such American units as the 
25th Infantry Division, the 1st Special Forces Group (Abn), and the 
8th ”kctical Fighter Wing, as well as Naval and Marine elements. Forty 
days in length, the exercise involves approximately 1,500 American 
soldiers and airmen and 2,500 Thai participants. 
Compared to those exercises undertaken in Central America,’Os 
Cobra Gold has not been used as a significant vehicle by which to 
address internal problems in Thailand; the key mission has been to 
directly express American support for the Kingdom in the event of 
external aggression. In this regard, the U S .  Pacific Command has 
been extremely effective. Hostile governments have paid close at- 
tention to each and every Cobra Gold exercise. A typical reaction 
coming out of a Bangkok newspaper had this to say about Vietnam’s 
reaction to Cobra Gold 1987: “The exercise was condemned by Viet- 
nam whose Hanoi radio described them last week as ‘the continua- 
tion of hostile acts of Bangkok ultra-rightist authorities against Laos, 
Vietnam, and Kampuchea.”’log 
Although Cobra Gold has not had a significant impact on neutraliz- 
ing the social and economic issues endemic to LIC, there is no ques- 
tion that it has been an outstanding force multiplier when viewed 
as a deterrent to external aggression. Considering the relatively small 
number of soldiers engaged, the exercises have certainly sent the 
appropriate signal to unfriendly states in the region, as well as to 
any disruptive internal factions. 
3. Use in the Indochina Model 
Combined training exercises will be a necessary component in the 
post-drawback era. These exercises demonstrate American support, 
while manifesting none of the evils related to permanent garrisons. 
In contrast, American troops are not viewed as “occupation” forces, 
but rather as partners and equals. Heartened by the realization that 
lo81d. 
‘OgRatchasima, Fitting Climax to Cobra Gold ’87, The Nation, Aug. 21, 1987, at 1, 
col. 1. 
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they must bear responsibility for their own defenses, host nation par- 
ticipants respond with tremendous zeal to the combined training. 
Accordingly, indigenous governments have very little trouble finding 
widespread local support for the use of American forces in this 
capacity. The thorny issue of territorial integrity is negated by the 
combined nature and the limited duration of these exercises. 
Combined training exercises can be effective, but only if they are 
properly funded, coordinated, and implemented on a year-to-year 
basis. When used in an Indochina strategy, planners will have to 
determine the frequency and regional allocation of the exercises, and 
other Southeast Asian countries, in addition to Thailand, must be 
offered the opportunity to participate. Since the principal argument 
for using combined training is to deter external aggression, the ques- 
tion of using these exercises as a vehicle to combat social and 
economic problems should also be clearly resolved. 
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
1. Congressional Support for  SOF 
The final method by which the United States may assist develop- 
ing countries is the use of its special operations forces (SOF). The 
genesis of modern SOF is most closely identified with President Ken- 
nedy."O Although the entire force structure virtually disappeared 
with the end of the Vietnam era, revitalization of SOF occurred in 
the 1980 '~!~~ Anticipating that most future conflicts would entail LIC 
situations, several key members of Congress placed top priority on 
special operations forces as the preferred weapon of choice. Those 
efforts resulted in widespread bipartisan support for SOF, culminating 
in the creation of a separate unified command, the United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)."2 
IloSee A. Banks, From OSS to Green Berets, The Birth of Special Forces (1986). 
l1lThornas, A Warrior Elite For the Dirty Jobs, Time, Jan. 13, 1986, a t  16-19. 
112Congressional commitment to SOF is reflected in several significant milestones 
dating from 1986. The first is the 1987 creation of USSOCOM, a unified independent 
command. Stressing interoperability, USSOCOM maintains operational control over 
all SOF assets of all services. The FY89 Defense Authorization Bill further mandates 
that the commander-in-chief of USSOCOM (USCINSOC) prepare and execute his own 
budget by 1992. The second is the establishment of a Low Intensity Conflict Board 
under the National Security Council. This, coupled with the third initiative, the crea- 
tion of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
Conflict (ASDSOLIC), ensures coordination of all federal agencies involved in LIC. See 
generally Rylander, The Congressional Approach to SOFReorganizatwn, Special War- 
fare, Spring 1989, a t  10-17. 
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Congress has been significantly involved in structuring the types 
of forces essential to effectively operate in a LIC environment. In- 
deed, Congress has taken the unprecedented step of establishing, 
through legislation, the specific mission activities of the SOF com- 
munity: direct action; strategic reconnaissance; unconventional war- 
fare; foreign internal defense; counterterrorism; civil affairs; psy- 
chological operations; humanitarian assistance; theater search and 
rescue; and other activitie~!’~ 
2. Peacetime Role of Special Forces (SF) 
The public mystique of the green beret as the ultimate jungle 
fighter capable of singlehandedly defeating entire enemy battalions 
clearly belies the real importance of these specialized and highly 
skilled ~oldiers.”~ While they certainly have significant wartime mis- 
sions, SF, a component of SOF, are most effective when executing 
their dual peacetime roles of prevention and deterrence!I5 Paradox- 
ically, when executing their peacetime role, it is in part because of- 
not in spite of-this aura that they enjoy public support and successes 
far in excess of what their limited numbers would imply. Currently, 
the Army has four active-duty brigade-sized Special Forces groups, 
each group operationally directed toward a particular segment of the 
world. 
a. Prevention 
The preventive SF role covers a full range of activities, to include 
training, teaching, and performing HCA in third world countries. 
Their principal purpose is to prevent the escalation of LIC. This is 
done by training indigenous people to defend themselves and, to a 
lesser degree, engaging in limited HCA missions in the more remote 
parts of the country. This civic action includes providing medical and 
veterinary aid, conducting various public services, and other ac- 
tivities aimed at improving living conditions. 
The primary mission in the prevention role, however, has always 
been training. It was during the Vietnam era that SF earned the 
coveted reputation of being premier trainers of indigenous forces in 
113National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987. Pub. Law No. 99-661. 
100 Stat. 3816 (1986). 
I1*See g e w u l l y  H. Halberstadt, Green Berets: Unconventional Warriors (1988) 
IWee generally Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Opera- 
tions Forces (Revised Coordinating Draft), Headquarters, para. 2-17 (November 1989) 
[hereinafter FM 100-251. 
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military skills. Thousands of tribesmen and local Vietnamese were 
successfully organized into effective self-defense forces. Then, as 
now, the secret to their achievements was hard training, common 
sense, and empathy. These professionals were required not only to 
be experts in their technical skills, but also they had to be proficient 
in the host language, totally familiar with the culture, and able to 
literally live in the same, often-times primitive, environments?16 To 
accomplish this, these men underwent extensive, intensive, and ex- 
pensive training. 
Carrying on this tradition, SF continue to teach host nation forces 
fundamental military skills, as well as more advanced tactics in both 
jungle and urban warfare. Accordingly, the mission to train and help 
organize indigenous local forces remains the cornerstone of modern 
SOF!17 The efforts crystalize as the host nation is better prepared to 
deal with overt manifestations of LIC through strengthened military 
capabilities. 
When used in their preventive capacity, SF are inherently suc- 
cessful, not only in providing needed military skills, but also in 
establishing an excellent rapport with the local population. This, quite 
naturally, helps defeat LIC at its roots. One SF medic conducting 
Foreign Internal Defense missions in Honduras described the typical 
attitude of the locals: “[Ilt is also a morale boost for them [Hon- 
durans]; if we’re out in the field with them, sweat with them, eat 
their food and drink their beer, then, by God, they appreciate what 
we’re doing and what we’re going through.”ll8 
If funded and employed as a security assistance asset, the train- 
ing activities are directly aimed at assisting the host nation through 
long-term, in-depth courses of instruction. Employed during com- 
bined training exercises, the SF may very well conduct similar ac- 
tivities, but their primary purpose is to train themselves, with the 
accruing benefits to the host country being categorized as secondary. 
The dispute, of course, is whether the use of exercise O&M funds 
violates the prohibition of using those monies for the training of host 
nation personnel?1Q 
Il6See Low Intensity Warfare (M. Klare & P. Kornbluh eds. 1988). 
l17FM 100-25, supra note 115. 
llSH. Halberstadt, supra note 114, at 50. 
llgComp. Gen. Letter, supra note 106, at para. I1 C & D. 
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In 1986 the Comptroller General recognized that such benefits af- 
forded the host nation do not violate the Economy Act,120 so long 
as the “training of indigenous forces is considered a by-product, with 
the primary objective for the activity being the training of the Special 
Forces to fill their role as instructors of friendly indigenous forces.”l21 
Turning on a question of primary purpose and scope, this is current- 
ly known as the “Special Forces exception.”122 
b. Deterrence 
The other critical peacetime role of SF is that of deterrence, a role 
that is particulary important in a crisis situation. In this role, the SF 
are used to “wave the flag’’-to be nothing less than concrete 
evidence that America is strongly committed to the host nation. A 
good illustration of this function occurred in 1963. Forces from the 
10th SF group were sent to Saudi Arabia at the request of that govern- 
ment as a demonstration of American support. At the time, the 
Saudis were supporting guerrilla forces seeking to overthrow what 
is now North Yemen, while Egypt was supporting the anti-royalist 
government. In keeping with the deterrent function, the SF were 
directed to perform numerous well-publicized mass parachute jumps 
with their Saudi counterparts in the cities of Jiddah and Ri~adh.’~3 
Show of force functions are relatively well suited to the SF, due 
again in part to their universal reputation as being America’s elite 
fighters. In 1987 the Soviet Military Review described them as be- 
ing “professional killers . . . with . . . a brutal hatred of the Com- 
munist countries.”124 Such “puffing” aside, these soldiers never fail 
to make an impression; no matter the story line, headlines always 
start with the same two words: “Green Berets.” 
3. Current Uses of Special Forces in Indochina 
Since the 1984 reactivation of the 1st Special Forces Group (Air- 
borne),’25 SF has been carving out a significant peacetime role in 
several Southeast Asian countries. Focused primarily at Thailand, 
although active in Malaysia and Indonesia, the 1st SFG(A) has in- 
lZ031 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1982). 
121Comp. Gen. Letter, supra note 106, at para. 11. C. 
lz2Id. 
lZ3FM 100-25, para. 2-17 and 2-18. 
124Privileged Killers, Soviet Military Review, January 1987, at 4.  
lZ5The 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is located at Fort Lewis, Washington, and 
consists of three battalions. The 1st Battalion is forward deployed to Okinawa, Japan. 
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creased its presence in the Kingdom from periodic small team 
deployments to the dedication of an entire battalion. While these 
numbers are still extremely modest, the soldiers are well-received 
by the Thai authorities as well as by the local population. 
The SF currently engage in recurring exercises and security 
assistance missions in Thailand. It is not uncommon for a trainer to 
spend fifty days in the Kingdom, return to his home post at Fort 
Lewis, Washington, for a month, and then return to Thailand for 
another forty day mission. 
The 1st Group not only undertakes security assistance missions in 
Thailand, but also regularly engages in various combined exercises. 
In some instances, the training activities have been conducted in such 
a way as to place emphasis on the deterrence function. In Cobra Gold 
1987, for example, the Green Berets conducted operations in Thai- 
land, even as Vietnamese troops were engaged in major assaults 
against Cambodian resistance forces along the border. The special 
forces operational base (SFOB)IZ6 was set up at a Thai military base 
in Lop Buri, and subsequent operations were openly conducted in 
the Kingdom in conjunction with Thai forces. During Cobra Gold 
1989, the decision was made to establish the SFOB nearer to the 
Burmese border. 
VI. AN INDOCHINA MODEL 
A .  SPECIAL FORCES A S  THE HEART 
1. General Characteristics of a Strategg 
A matching of the basic criteria for the Indochina model against 
the peacetime missions of SF makes it apparent that the precedent 
set by the SF, particularly in Thailand, is the key to formulating an 
Indochina formula, from both the perspective of the sending and 
receiving states: 
-Constantly functioning throughout the territories of the host na- 
tion, the requirement to maintain a high visibility American presence 
is satisfied. 
-Such a use of American personnel does not violate the “rules 
of the game” and would not prompt escalation from hostile forces. 
126A special forces operational base (SFOB) is a command, control, and support base. 
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-With the U.S. forces operating on a rotating basis, the issue of 
establishing a permanent base is amiably resolved. While the In- 
dochina model would probably call for a fixed stationing area for 
logistical support, the solution is again offered by the current SF ex- 
ercises; the base could be set up at an existing Thai military facility. 
-The soldiers deployed are elite professionals, trained to operate 
within LIC environments. Participation in security assistance pro- 
grams to combat the causes of LIC is endemic to the special forces. 
Host governments invariably view the skills imparted by the SF as 
invaluable. 
-Because the green berets know the language, culture, and en- 
vironment, the soldiers foster an atmosphere of unity with the in- 
digenous people. Nationalistic animosities are kept to a minimum. 
-Both Indochina and America have become accustomed to the 
peacetime roles of SF; the model will not be instituting new concepts, 
only building on activities already successfully being undertaken. 
This fact should assist in relieving American anxiety concerning 
deploying soldiers to Indochina. 
-An equitable distribution of SF to all the friendly nations would 
alleviate local concerns over balance of power shifts. 
All of the above factors militate towards constructing the Indochina 
model around an expanded use of special forces. For showing the 
flag, being welcomed by our friends, dealing effectively with LIC 
issues, and protecting American interests, they are without equal. 
The critical issues will be of funding and size. 
2. Funding and Size 
To avoid a disjointed model, the use of SF should be expressly 
recognized and funded either as a special security assistance in- 
itiative or as a legitimate use of a separate appropriation. The cur- 
rent “SF exception” cannot be expanded. In the 1980’s, Congress 
showed that it understood the value of special forces. With forceful 
leadership, it can be persuaded, in the 199O’s, that the SF role must 
be expanded to protect our interests in Indochina. From the stand- 
point of cost, the use of special forces is a bargain. 
Initially, at least the equivalent of a full brigade should be 
specifically assigned to each of the friendly states in Indochina. This 
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would ensure a force commitment capable of making an appropriate 
impact and the maintenance of a manageable rotation cycle. Deci- 
sions on how to best utilize the green berets assigned to the country 
should be made in conjunction with the unified command, the U.S. 
country team,’27 and host nation authorities. 
B. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND 
COMBINED TRAINING EXERCISES 
The full range of security assistance programs must be used to at- 
tack the social and economic maladies that contribute to LIC and 
to provide meaningful assistance to military preparedness. Because 
congressional restrictions on security assistance will require the 
greatest reforms, plannerj should not expend their efforts on pro- 
posing major legislative corrections, but should advocate a separate 
funding source for security assistance under a regional account con- 
cept. Since this would not entail a structural overhaul, consensus 
would only require marrying the appropriated monies to the pro- 
posed expanded use of the special forces or, in the alternative, pro- 
viding the funds directly to the unified command for allocation. 
Regardless of the approach used, it is essential that the Indochina 
model contain a tangible and predictable security assistance package 
that administrators can efficiently tailor in an autonomous manner. 
Likewise, the inclusion of periodic combined training exercises 
would add the necessary muscle to the model, dispelling any residual 
notions that America had ceased to care for the region. Again, how- 
ever, concrete agreement must be achieved concerning the conduct 
of HCA and training activities in the context of combined training 
exercises. Statutory requirements cannot be circumvented. 
C. LEGAL ISSUES FOR THE 
ON-GROUND MILITARY ATTORNEY 
Military attorneys from all of the services must not only be pre- 
pared to address myriad questions concerning the legal issues con- 
nected with proposals for an Indochina strategy, but also they must 
stand ready to fulfill crucial implementation roles once a coherent 
model is adopted. Developing the capability to intelligently respond 
to such issues is best achieved by taking a proactive view: anticipating 
12The Country Team is the “executive committee of an embassy, headed by the chief 
of mission, and consists of the principal representatives of the government depart- 
ments and agencies present (for example, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, 
Commerce, and the USIA, USAID, DEA, and CIA).” FM 100-25, a t  8. 
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probable requirements; identifying the associated legal implications; 
and discussing the impact JZ8 
The on-ground attorney must be highly motivated, legally profi- 
cient, and able to be equally at ease with host nation officials as he 
is with his own people. In combating LIC issues in a developing coun- 
try, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low-Intensity Conflict cor- 
rectly points out the need to pick the highly motivated professional: 
“[Tlhey have to be good. They have to be knowledgeable. They have 
to be persuasive. They have to have a high degree of professional 
competence. The history of low-intensity conflict reveals again and 
again the important-indeed overriding-role that one man can play 
. . . .”lZ9 Whle additional combined training exercises and some form 
of enhanced security assistance will no doubt be a part of the model, 
the function of the on-ground forces will pose the most significant 
operational law (OPLAW) issues, requiring servicing attorneys to 
become well-versed in this area of the lawJ30 
1. Status of the American Soldier 
Because the central focus of the proposed model is the use of 
special forces personnel in the host nation, the premier legal con- 
sideration is identifying the jurisdictional status of the forces while 
in-country. Currently, there are no SOFA’S in effect in Indochina; U S .  
troops are subject to the full local civil and criminal jurisdiction of 
the host nation unless, as discussed, they have been accorded some 
form of jurisdictional immunityJ31 American negotiators should seek 
similar status arrangements for the SF soldiers operating in the pro- 
lZ81n December 1988 the Secretary of the Army directed the establishment of the 
Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). Located at The Judge Advocate 
General’s School of the Army in Charlottesville, Virginia, this center examines both 
current and potential legal issues attendant to military operations. Drawing on military, 
civilian, and allied legal expertise, CLAMO not only better prepares attorneys to deal 
with operational legal issues as they exist, but also, as a concurrent function, attempts 
to anticipate future developments in military operations-ensuring identification, 
discussion, and implementation of those legal doctrines that will accompany transi- 
tions in the field. Memorandum to the Judge Advocate General from Secretary Marsh 
(Dec. 21, 1988), reprinted in The Army Lawyer, April 1989, at 3. 
129Whitehouse, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, DISAM Journal, 
Spring 1989, at 70. 
I3The working definition of Operational Law, as used at the Judge Advocate General’s 
School, is “[tlhat body of law, both domestic and international, impacting specifical- 
ly upon legal issues associated with the planning for and deployment of U.S. forces 
in both peacetime and combat environments.” The Judge Advocate General’s School, 
International Law Deskbook, ADI-5, The Graduate Course Operational Law Deskbook, 
at i (1989). 
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posed model. While the US. should also attempt to bargain for the 
best status possible for the troops who participate in the periodic 
combined training exercises, the host country will probably be reluc- 
tant to grant more than a NATO-type arrangement of shared 
jurisdiction. 
2. Know the Host Nation 
The on-ground legal advisor must be completely familiar with the 
culture, customs, and laws of the host nation. Even though all of the 
states in issue have incorporated elements of European jurisprudence 
into their legal structure, many aspects of the malum prohibitum 
statutes are based on cultural heritage. Indonesia, for example, has 
numerous criminal sanctions based on Islamic traditions; other na- 
tions incorporate Buddhist and 'hoist criminal concepts. In Thailand, 
one can be imprisoned for up to fifteen years for defaming or insulting 
the King, the Queen, or any heir-a~parent!~~ Obviously, the servic- 
ing attorney must be fully cognizant of the full range of the civil and 
criminal codes. 
The judge advocate must establish a close liaison with the host 
authorities at all levels. Opportunities for enhanced cooperation must 
be actively pursued to ensure quick resolution of the inevitable civil 
and criminal violations that will occur. Personal contacts always pay 
excellent dividends, particularly in regard to the disposition of minor 
offenses. 
3. Know the Mission 
Finally, the military attorney must thoroughly understand the mis- 
sion of the forces he represents, accompanying the troops into the 
host nation. Only when this is juxtaposed, with a knowledge of the 
appropriate OPLAW considerations, running the gamut from claims 
to rules of engagement, will the judge advocate properly discharge 
his functionJ33 
13ZThe Thai Penal Code, book 11, title I, chapter I, section 112, QS amended by arti- 
cle 1 of the Order (No.41) of the National Administrative Reform Council in B.E. 2519. 
133See Walsh, Role of tFR Judge Advocate in Special Operations, The Army Lawyer, 
Aug. 1989, at 4-10. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
From Okinawa to Korea, the writing is on the wall: major cuts will 
be instituted; withdrawals of American forces will take place. The 
appearance of a de facto U.S. retreat from its responsibilities in the 
region can be overcome only by formulating a post withdrawal policy 
that will evidence its unquestioned commitment to Indochina. 
Without such a strategy, the cumulative effect of an erosion of con- 
fidence on the part of its friends, LIC escalations, and acts of exter- 
nal military aggression could well be devastating to American in- 
terests in the region. There is a growing urgency for Thailand and 
her sister countries to be offered concrete American support. 
Fortunately, the blueprint of an Indochina model is substantially 
in place, and it does not call for the establishment of alternate bases, 
elaborate new weapons systems, or massive foreign aid packages. 
With an increased deployment of its special forces assests and an 
expanded use of combined training exercises, PACOM, in conjunc- 
tion with USSOCOM, can adequately tailor an agenda to simultane- 
ously combat LIC, while deterring external threats. The real issue 
will be providing the unified command with the flexibility and fund- 
ing to make the model viable. This challenge will be met only if Con- 
gress is made aware that the model can function effectively within 
the already existing DOD infrastructure and that modifications in 
current security assistance priorities must be made. 
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